

# Are Washington's Daily Newspapers Keeping You Informed About SALT II?

The Washington Star reported nothing of what Gen. Graham said, although it mentioned (two days later) that Graham made "attacks on the draft treaty."

The Washington Post reported nothing of what Gen. Graham said.

On April 11, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was one of seven experts on U.S. Defense Intelligence who addressed an American Security Council news conference with more than 50 reporters.

Here is what the former head of our defense intelligence said\*

## The New York Times reported:

The accord could not be verified. Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said the loss of electronic listening posts in Iran and the Soviet Union's acquisition of a manual describing an advanced photo-reconnaissance satellite had made it impossible to guard against Soviet efforts to cheat. He said the Government's assurances that the United States could monitor compliance were fraudulent.

## The Baltimore Sun Reported:

Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, retired director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and a coalition co-chairman, said officials "push themselves to the point of fraud" in trying to persuade that the treaty can be verified.

He cited Russian acquisition of the technical manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite, from which they learned that the vehicle carried cameras and equipment to relay pictures to ground stations (A former Central Intelligence Agency employee was convicted of espionage in the case). The KH-11 was "our best hope for verification," General Graham said.

He scoffed at administration claims that airborne spy equipment can replace the lost Iranian monitoring sites. The latter gave 24-hour-a-day coverage of key Russian missile centers and told the U.S. when to have satellite cameras zero in on crucial rocket tests, he said. The general said spy planes cannot replace the Iranian sites, and satellites that could replace them cannot be developed in the life of the treaty.

Other coalition leaders assailed the treaty's failure to put limits in the Soviet Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile.

## \* NOT EVEN SALT I CAN BE VERIFIED—NOW:

SALT II Treaties cannot be verified and in fact, given the loss of intelligence capabilities over the last year, SALT I cannot be verified. Why? Because for one thing we have lost the secrecy that was involved in the KH-11 program, which was the best program we had for verifying the SALT Treaties—sold by ex-CIA employee Kampelis to the Soviet Union for three thousand dollars. The Soviets never knew until they got that manual that in fact that satellite took pictures. As a matter of fact when they saw how that thing operated, they obviously thought that it was collecting signals, and signals can, as they have proved in the past, be taken care of by encryption of telemetry and other means...At least for a year I could count on the fact that the Soviets wouldn't know what that satellite was doing. This would have been a strong supporting reason to say "Yes, we've got a good shot at verification." So that loss was critical, no matter what the Administration says about it.

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**\* THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS IN IRAN:**

Probably more critical was the loss of those facilities in Iran, which looked down upon the two most important geographical entities in the Soviet Union, as far as verification is concerned. It kept a 24-hour watch, with all sorts of detection devices, all sorts of intelligence capabilities, on the place where the ICBM missiles are launched, and the place where the anti-ballistic missiles are launched, or tested by the Soviet Union...The 24-hour watch was extremely critical not only because of what it gathered directly, from the Soviet testing, but because that represented the tip-off which we in intelligence then used to tell other satellites to zero in on a test that was about to take place or to notify aircraft based in Alaska to get out and watch for events at the end of the trajectory. And thus those facilities were absolutely critical for verification. When this Administration tells you they can replace those capabilities in Turkey, that is fraudulent. You cannot do it because the Caucasus mountains stand between Turkey and those ranges which were so critical to verification.

**\* CARTER ADMINISTRATION FRAUD:**

When the Administration says they can fly airplanes up there and do it: fraudulent! There's no way you can keep an airplane up there 24 hours a day. Nor is there any way you can load those tons and tons of equipment that were necessary to the Iranian sites on an airplane, let alone a U-2.

When they tell you they can replace it with satellites, I'll tell you this; I've been in the business of putting up intelligence-collecting satellites, and I can tell you without anybody gainsaying me that if today if we knew precisely what we wanted the engineers to do, and if it were technically feasible to do so, and we said get to work on putting up satellites to replace those lost in Iran, there is no way that those satellites could be producing evidence, information pertinent to the implementation of this treaty until the end of the treaty period. So that is fraud that they're putting out. They're putting out fraud because they desperately know that these treaties cannot be verified.

**\* ENCRYPTING (putting into code) TELEMETRY (signals as to operation of missiles, from boxes on the missiles—which signals can be intercepted):**

They also tacitly agree that one of the positions that is still to be negotiated with the Soviet Union is whether or not they shall or shall not continue to encrypt their telemetry from their missile tests. They've admitted by their own actions in Geneva these days that that is not true.

When they make this an issue with the Soviet Union, how can they then say, as we've said all along, that things are perfectly verifiable? If it were true, why bother the Soviets to get them to stop something that they have been doing for four years, that we have not complained is interference with our national technical means of verification?

**\* THE CARTER CRITERION FOR VERIFICATION—AND HOW THE ADMIRAL CAN MEASURE UP TO IT:**

If one believes that essential equivalents, or strategic parity, or whatever term they may be using next year, may be "tolerable inferiority"—if you extract the definition that is suggested by President Carter himself in his State of the Union message that one Poseidon submarine can do so much damage that it in itself represents strategic equivalence; then what difference does it make how much the Soviets cheat on SALT? You could meet the requirements for adequate verification today without any intelligence capability whatsoever.

So small wonder that Turner will come forward and say Quote Yes, we can adequately verify the SALT agreements; unquote: L.K.